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Re´gis Dandoy*
The Impact of Government Participation
and Prospects on Party Policy
Preferences in Belgium
This article analyses the impact of government prospects and government
participation on party policy preferences. Comparing the content of manifestos
of governing and opposition parties in Belgium during three decades, I observed
that the relationship of a party to the act of governing influences the content
of its manifesto. In that sense, party preferences are not only driven by ideology
and vote-seeking arguments but are part of a larger party strategy: parties
adapt their electoral platform when they are in government or are willing
to enter into it. The conclusion of the article also discusses the literature on
government formation. Such literature hypothesizes that parties that are
ideologically similar would form a coalition. However, results for the Belgian
case demonstrate that parties strategically adapt their electoral platform when
wanting to enter the government. Coalitions are made up of parties with similar
policy preferences, not because they ‘are’ alike but because parties strategically
‘make’ them alike.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY POLICY PREFERENCES AND
coalition formation – that is, whether parties that were close in
these terms were more or less likely to form coalitions – has been
extensively analysed by the Comparative Manifesto Project. In their
seminal work that relied on 11 country studies, Laver and Budge
(1992) proved that ideological connectedness is a strong predictor
for coalition building. Many authors followed this path and party
preferences have often been used in explanations of coalition
and government formation, including the content of the coalition
agreements (see, for example, Aarts et al. 1999; Bara 2001;
Bra¨uninger and Debus 2009; Budge 1992; Budge and Laver 1993;
Keman 2007; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Quinn et al.
2011; Rihoux et al. 2005; Tegenbos 1974; de Vries et al. 2001),
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government declarations (Hearl 1992) or throne speeches (Bara
2005). In their case studies on the Netherlands and Belgium, Thomson
(1999) and Timmermans (2003) have shown that coalition agreements
contain issues that are salient to the coalition parties and for which
they have formulated policy pledges, even when they disagree on the
solution to such issues. The coalition agreements do not focus only on
non-divisive issues;1 on the contrary, during the negotiations the
pledges most salient to each party are included in the agreement to
avoid disagreements along the way and to present an image of a
decisive body that will last its full term.
This article challenges conventional wisdom since it argues that,
rather than party policy or ideology explaining government
participation, government participation explains party policy pre-
ferences. Party preferences2 – consisting of the relative amount of
attention allocated by parties to specific policy issues – are known to
be important. But the analysis of the factors that shape these policy
preferences is rarely dealt with in the literature.3 Most studies in
political science consider party policy preferences as an indepen-
dent variable. Party preferences are crucial in the explanation of,
for example, policy outputs and election results. But what explains
party preferences? In my research design, party policy preferences
are used as a dependent variable. The explanation of party policy
preferences is rather complex since, following Budge and Farlie (1983:
129), ‘many factors shape a manifesto other than election considera-
tions’. These potential explanations are numerous and very diverse,
such as internal dissent, party organization, median voter position,
party size, referendum, public opinion, real-world events, party system
fractionalization, party competition, electoral results, popularity of
party leaders, party activists, state organization and decentralization,
and so on. Even if the party preferences and priorities are a complex
issue for political parties, the role of political science is, in this regard,
to identify the most important phenomena at stake. This study intends
to contribute to the identification of the most important variables
in party policy preferences by outlining the role of one specific
phenomenon: government participation.
Starting from the basic assumption that party policy preferences
are not alike over time (that is, they vary from election to election)
or over space (that is, they vary between parties), hypotheses can be
derived from the political science literature in order to explain these
variations. The main goal of this article is to explain the preferences
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of political parties at the time of elections with the main assumption
that their government participation and their desire to enter the
next government influence these preferences. Indeed, government-
participation and -formation processes are closely linked to policy
issues. Voters and the media link parties in the government with
specific policy issues while they link parties outside the government
with other issues.
In this study, I will develop an analytical framework that allows us
to explain party policy preferences in Belgium in the context of
participation in government. I developed my study around the
analysis of party manifestos for parliamentary elections, hypothesiz-
ing that the status of a party (whether it is in government or in the
opposition) and its ability/willingness to enter the next government
have an impact on how close its policy preferences are to those of
the other parties. In other words, I expect to observe an ideological
proximity for parties that governed together as well as for parties
that would like to enter government together. The hypotheses that
the executive (governing party or potential coalition partner) will
influence party policy preferences may seem trivial, but this issue has
seldom been discussed in political science and is crucially lacking
empirical evidence.
This article is in three parts. In the first section, the literature on
the impact of government-related factors on party policy preferences
is analysed. Three main hypotheses will be derived from this review,
focusing on three different aspects of the party–executive relationship:
the party as a negotiator or a potential coalition partner, the party as
an incumbent that is part of a coalition (with other governing parties)
and the party as an incumbent that is distinct from opposition parties.
The second section presents the data and methodological elements of
my study of Belgian party manifestos, while the third part is devoted
to the empirical test of the three main hypotheses. The conclusion
will summarize the main findings of this study while outlining some
methodological considerations about the use of party preferences in
analysing coalition formation.
GOVERNMENT AND PARTY PREFERENCES
Government participation is a key variable in the explanation of party
policy preferences, even if it can also be related to other political
phenomena such as party size and electoral success. The variables of
631THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION AND PROSPECTS
Jc The Author 2013. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
government formation and participation have often been used as
dependent variables explained by the content of the manifestos –
that is, parties that are close ideologically are more likely to form a
coalition – including the understanding of the content of the coalition
agreements, government declaration or throne speeches, but much
more rarely as an independent (for an exception, see Daubler 2010) or
control variable (for an exception, see Tavits 2008).
The party–government relationship and its effect on the content
of manifestos have to be assessed at two distinct times:4 the process
of government formation and negotiation (that is, mainly after the
elections and the drafting of the manifestos) and the process of
incumbency and accountability for government record (that is,
mainly before the elections and the drafting of the manifestos).
Government Formation
Ideological positions are important in order to explain government
formation (see the abundant literature on this aspect of the
government formation process), but this process in turn has an
impact on party policy preferences. A manifesto consists of a sum of
various intentions, emphases, promises, pledges and goals that
will be activated once the party enters government (Bara 2005:
290, 297). The content of manifestos is sometimes affected by
expectations that a coalition will be formed (Hearl 1987a: 258), and
‘office opportunities affect party preferences’ (Kitschelt 1994: 127).
Most of the parties are office seeking, and the fact that they perform
well in elections is often not sufficient for them to enter a coalition.
As a result, the parties have to adopt positions in their manifestos
that render them ‘acceptable’ to the other potential partners.
This modification of the ideological profile can be done in different
ways. First, the party may want to soften the content of its manifesto or
ideologically moderate its policy stances when bargaining with other
parties (Mattila et al. 2007: 283). For Dittrich (1987: 228), the ‘need to
build coalition governments pushes parties who actually want to enter
government to adopt a rather moderate attitude in their manifesto’.
This author adds later that parties show a tendency to move towards
the centre of the ideological dimension.
Similarly, party manifestos tend to be rather vague because they
seek to maintain their viability as coalition partners (Aarts et al.
1999: 64). Issue positions displayed in manifestos are therefore
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expected to remain vague. Even though some argued that policy
pledges are expected to be less vague or ambiguous than other
manifesto statements (Pe´try and Landry 2001), analysts of pledges
made by winning parties confirmed this (increasing) vagueness of
manifestos (see, for example, Bara 2005: 590). In order for the party
to be accepted as a credible coalition partner, the policy preferences
of a party should not only be moderate and/or vague but they
should also be realistic (Heinisch 2003: 101; and for the Belgian
case, Anon. 1973: 1031). In other words, parties are expected to
focus on issues and pledges that can be realistically achieved by the
forthcoming cabinet.
The vagueness and moderation of a party manifesto may be
related to the type of issue at stake. Two main types of issues can be
distinguished: position and valence issues. Valence issues are often
considered to be consensual issues – that is, issues on which there is
agreement on the desired outcome across the whole electorate and
one clear ideological position for all political parties (Katsanidou
and Gemenis 2010). Unlike position issues, party preferences on
valence issues may remain vague, moderate or even unrealistic.
Subsequently, one might think that parties wanting to enter
government would avoid emphasizing potentially polarizing posi-
tion issues and would favour stressing valence issues.
However, party preferences are also a relative phenomenon when
we are considering government formation: moderate and realistic
preferences do not fully guarantee government participation since
the preferences of the parties that wish to enter the government
should not be too far from each other. The parties should not
confront issues that would exclude them from participating in
government. Parties have a clear incentive not to put on the agenda
issues about which they disagree with potential coalition partners
(van der Brug 2001: 116).
In this regard, Hearl (1987a: 268) hypothesized that parties
that share a governmental vocation demonstrate a high degree of
consensus. Since parties are able to choose their own policy
preferences, they should tend to minimize the ideological distance
between the different coalition partners (Kitschelt 1994: 125; Ray 2007:
17). More precisely, Bale (2003: 75) argued that when centre-right
parties want to enter a government together with the extreme right,
they focus their manifestos on issues belonging to the extreme-
right parties’ agenda: anti-immigration and welfare-chauvinist issues.
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Another example is to be found in the Dutch case in 1998.
De Vries et al. (2001: 207) observed that the green party presented a
manifesto that was not distinct from other parties’ non-environmental
issues as this party was seeking government participation and
wanted to be considered as a potential coalition partner. Inversely,
when the incumbent party anticipates a change of majority, it
should focus on issues that will constrain the policy choices of the
next policymaker – that is, the next party in government (Dellis
2009: 206). As a result, the government formation hypothesis is
formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Parties willing to enter government display similar policy
preferences.
Incumbency and Government Participation
The second period of the party–government relationship deals
with the effect of incumbency. Whether a party is in opposition or
is part of the governmental coalition at the time of the manifesto
release is a crucial factor when we look to explain the content of
this document. Several phenomena are at stake here, relating to the
government’s record. Indeed, the government’s record or particular
actions and decisions made while in government are important for
our understanding of the issues addressed during an electoral
campaign and are a predominating concern in manifestos (Budge
1992; Budge and Farlie 1983; Klingemann et al. 1994: 24; Netjes
and Binnema 2007: 43).
On one hand, government action covers a large range of different
policies and policy domains. Yet, since one of the functions of a
manifesto – and more largely of an election campaign – is to discuss
and evaluate the government’s outputs, Marks et al. (2007: 28)
expect that the manifestos of parties in government have to develop
policy positions on a wider spectrum of issues. Governing parties are
often linked and identified with the policy issues discussed and
decisions taken while they are in government and are expected to
defend the government record – particularly when it concerns
successful policy outcomes – on a variety of issues. As a result, one
could expect that the positions of the governing parties would
be less radical and less innovative as they are constrained by the
government record.
634 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Jc The Author 2013. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
On the other hand, manifestos from governing parties display an
‘inability to provide distinct programmatic positions in the government
functions’ (Kritzinger and McElroy 2010: 24). Indeed, if all governing
parties are similarly bound by the government record – particularly as
they all want to discuss successful policy outcomes – they might be
expected to look alike. In other words, manifestos of incumbent parties
should be similar (Louwerse 2009: 17). Nonetheless, even if parties in
government find it difficult to dissociate themselves from the actions of
the government on certain policy stances, it does not mean that policy
changes are excluded. Shifts of party position are possible but only
in a gradual way (Budge 1992: 13).
Even though in the case of France, Pe´try and Pennings (2006:
105) observed changes in overall means for some policy issues
following government participation, empirical evidence demon-
strated that this hypothesis is not always verified. The hypothesis has
been rejected by Alonso and Gomez (2010: 23), for example,
concerning the decentralization issue. For the Spanish regional case
they found that, even if the incumbent party has incentives to convey
an image as defender of regional interest vis-a`-vis the central
government and the rest of the regions in order to stay in office,
there is no difference between majority and opposition manifestos.
Netjes and Binnema (2007: 44) believed that government participa-
tion contributes to explaining the salience of an issue in party
manifestos since it might be expected to force governing parties to
take clear-cut stances on that issue, but they found no empirical
evidence to support that hypothesis. Ray (2007: 20) similarly found
that cabinet participation had no impact on preferences expressed
in party manifestos.
One can also identify an incumbency effect within the cabinet – that
is, regarding ministerial portfolios. A party is influenced not only by the
government record as a whole but also by the fact that its ministers
hold specific policy portfolios. This party is therefore expected to deal
in its manifesto with the policy domains covered by its ministers (Marks
et al. 2007). For example, in the Dutch case, Kleinnijenhuis and
Pennings (2001: 173) observed that the fact that the Labour Party
(Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA) held the Ministry of Environment
explained its heavier emphasis on issues concerning the environment.
Not only is the content of the manifestos of the governing parties
expected to resemble – in terms of policy preferences – the cabinet’s
agenda, but governing parties’ manifestos are therefore expected to
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look alike. Parties are closer to each other when they have previous
experience of governing together (Budge 1992: 18) and they should
display more similar manifestos than any other pair of parties
(whether in government or in opposition). This was the case for
Norway, where the parties that were in coalition between 1965 and
1970 moved closer (Budge et al. 1976: 16). Concerning the Belgian
case, Hearl (1987b: 240) empirically observed that government
participation explains why some parties (namely, the Christian
People’s Party–Social Christian Party (Christelijke Volkspartij–Parti
Social Chre´tien – CVP-PSC) and the Socialist Party (Socialistische
Partij–Parti Socialiste – SP-PS)) have similar concerns for issues
such as technology, social justice, social services, education and
minorities. Likewise, regarding positions on the EU, Bornschier
(2010: 24) observed that governing parties – since the EU is the
project of the governing parties, and these parties have participated
in the making of the European polity – do not differ significantly in
their posture regarding the integration process. As a result, my
second hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Incumbent parties display similar policy preferences
The other side of the incumbency phenomenon is related to the
party’s opposition status. According to the literature on party
manifestos, the fact that the party is in the opposition has a
significant effect on the content of its manifesto. Opposition parties
have a structural advantage over government parties as they benefit
from having more liberty to address the issues they prefer (Dalton
1985: 290; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Similarly, Marks
et al. (2007: 28) hypothesized that the positions of opposition parties
tend to be more focused and more innovative than those of
governing parties, and Klingemann et al. (1994: 28) stated that
‘opposition parties have strong incentives for innovative framing of
alternatives to current policy’. Since governing parties have to
develop policy preferences on a wider spectrum of issues, they have
less room for strategic issue targeting. One can therefore argue that
opposition parties may choose the topics they focus on in their
manifesto more freely and in a more radical way than incumbents.
Following the argument regarding the type of issue at stake,
opposition parties might contemplate making space for potentially
polarizing (position) issues rather than consensual valence issues.
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Indeed, Louwerse (2009: 17) found that governing parties are closer
to each other than opposition ones.
More precisely, a party in opposition will emphasize specific issues
as a way to put the government in difficulties. Opposition parties
use their manifestos as a public platform in order to criticize the
government record and policy outputs – while maybe also targeting
specific parties – and to present alternative policy solutions. Similarly,
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2009: 23) believe that opposition
parties can force governing parties to pay attention to the issues that
favour the opposition. This appears to be particularly true in the case
of the moral issues in Belgium (Varone et al. 2005: 263). Nonetheless,
analyses of the Spanish case taught us that government participation
has no influence: compared to governing parties, a party in oppo-
sition in a region does not particularly use decentralization issues as a
way of putting the government in a difficult position (Alonso and
Go´mez 2009: 12). Kerr (1987: 131) added that ‘issues may unite
parties in common opposition to governmental policies’ – that is,
opposition parties should share policy priorities while criticizing the
government record. On these specific policy issues, opposition parties
are expected to look alike.
Overall, these different aspects regarding the content of the
manifestos of opposition parties (freedom of issues, radical issues,
innovation, critique of the government record, and so on, as well as
elements mentioned regarding incumbency effects) lead to the
hypothesis according to which one should observe a clear distinction
between the manifestos of the governing and opposition parties:
Hypothesis 3: Governing and opposition parties display different policy
preferences.
DATA AND METHOD
Several indicators are often used in order to measure party policy
preferences. The particularity of the estimations based on party
manifestos is that they clearly determine the position of a party at
each election. By definition, the obtained information comes from
an official document that was approved by the party: it is not even
unusual that the majority of the party members and affiliates have
formally to approve the document before the election. Electoral
programmes are therefore considered as valid indicators of the
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positions of parties regarding certain domains of public policy at a
given point in time (Volkens 2001).
In the framework of a research project – the Comparative Agendas
Project (CAP) – aimed at analysing the positions of the Belgian
political parties, a systematic thematic coding of the content
of the party manifestos was set. Inspired by the original work of
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the Belgian version of the Compara-
tive Agendas Project5 uses a slightly adapted version of their topical
codebook to identify and track issue attention within several policy
agendas (of parties, parliament, government, media, and so on) from
1977 to 2008. The codebook contains over 250 topic codes, organized
by main topic category. The three most important issues in the
Belgian manifestos for that period are intergovernmental relations
(that is, the relations between the different policy tiers of government),
social affairs and fiscal policy.
Party manifestos were coded per quasi-sentence, a procedure used by
the Manifestos Research Group’s Comparative Manifesto Project
handbook (Budge et al. 2001). This coding procedure consists of
identifying all the issues put forward in a document. If several ideas are
expressed within a larger sentence, they would all be coded. This
procedure applies very strict rules with respect to identifying such core
ideas or quasi-sentences and was carefully executed. In addition, coding
procedures allows a multiple coding for the same quasi-sentence,
and various dummy variables were also added, allowing us to identify
pledges, titles, references to other parties and so forth. About 250,000
quasi-sentences were coded, with an average of 2,435 per manifesto.
Regarding the time frame, 1978 can be considered as the starting
point of contemporary Belgian politics. Up to 1968, the three
mainstream parties displayed united and bilingual structures but, in
a period of 10 years (1968–78), the Belgian unitary party system
became completely regionalized as each mainstream party split into
two independent parties (one Flemish, one French-speaking). These
events had an important impact on various aspects of the Belgian
political arena, among which are party positions. In this research,
I therefore decided to focus on the contemporary period, starting
with the elections preceding the split of the last mainstream party in
1978 up to the 2007 federal elections – that is, the 10 legislative
elections that occurred from 1977 to 2007.
In regard to case selection, I included all parties that were at
least represented in three elections in the federal House of
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Representatives – 13 parties: two Christian democrats, two social
democrats, two liberals, two greens, two extreme right and three
regionalists. With the exception of the French-speaking Socialist
Party, ecologist Ecolo and National Front (Front National – FN), all
other parties changed their name within the observed period. In
addition, several electoral alliances were formed, as well as a few party
splits, but the structure of the party system remained quite stable over
time. The content of the manifestos of about 9 to 11 parties for each
election year has been coded. The database obtained therefore consists
of the content of exactly 100 party manifestos on about 250 different
policy issues and spread over 31 years.
In order to measure similarities between party manifestos,
correlations appear to constitute the proper method of analysis.6
To put it simply, when the correlation scores are high, it is assumed
that the two documents are somewhat similar. Correlations are
calculated based on issue emphases in different party manifestos,
across parties and/or over time. Examples of the use of correlations
in order to measure similarities between manifestos are to be found
in several works (Gabel and Hix 2002; Janda et al. 1995; Netjes
and Binnema 2007; Ray 2007). Similarly, Pe´try and Landry (2001:
133) assess interparty distances by correlating the shares of party
programmes devoted to particular issue categories.
Yet, some aspects of the use of correlations have to be pinpointed.
First, correlations have been made on the whole manifesto – that is,
all policy categories taken together and excluding non-codable
items. Each manifesto has been used as a unit of analysis in the
calculation of the different correlation scores for each pair of
manifestos. Secondly, if significance is not an issue when dealing
with the whole period under scrutiny, disaggregating the data per
type of party or per election year produces important drops in the
number of observations. One has to remain cautious with the results
obtained with such a small N. In addition, much has been discussed
about the minimally acceptable correlation scores. I follow McDonald
and Mendes (2001: 111), who considered correlations of 0.80 as
acceptable. Correlations between 0.70 and 0.50 will be considered as
moderate, while correlations below 0.50 will be considered as weak.
In order to test the hypothesis concerning parties that want to enter
government (Hypothesis 1), I used the proxy of an indicator based on
whether the party was associated with any of the negotiation talks
before the actual formation of the government. Indeed, one of the
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main characteristics of the Belgian government formation process is
its long duration. The formation of an executive is sometimes
a long-term process, and it is not rare that different coalition formulas
are tested – including different parties – before the actual government
formation. For example, the formation of the Martens I cabinet in
1978 was preceded by 11 unsuccessful attempts gathering different
parties. I believe that a party that accepts to participate in the
negotiation talks is by definition willing to enter the government.
This proxy for the parties that want to enter the cabinet is based on
data from Dumont and De Winter (1999) and on my update for the
governments formed after 1999.
Like Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994: 47) and Daubler
(2010: 20), I operationalized the two government-related variables
(that is, concerning the two hypotheses of incumbency and
government participation) using dummy variables. The variable
related to the negotiation process concerns the parties that were
included in the government formation talks, while the incumbency
variable measures whether the party was part of the governmental
coalition at the time of the manifesto release, independently from
the number of portfolios held by each party and from its
participation in the regional cabinets. The list of parties included
in both variables is to be found in the Appendix.
RESULTS
Government Formation
Three different hypotheses have been derived from the literature
(see above), each focusing on a different aspect of the government
formation and participation. The very first hypothesis relies on the
fact that parties that want to enter cabinet not only display realistic
and moderate party preferences but also that these preferences
should be close to their potential coalition partners’. In other words,
it is expected that the manifestos of parties that want to enter
government are similar. This hypothesis is difficult to verify since
one can hardly identify which parties want to enter government and
which ones wish to remain in the opposition. As indicated above,
I used a proxy based on the parties that were formally included in
the government formation negotiations.7
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The problem with the use of this proxy is that sometimes it leaves
few parties outside the negotiation talks. For example, the negotiations
for the formation of the Tindemans IV cabinet included all Belgian
parliamentary parties, with the exception of the Walloon Rally
(Rassemblement Wallon – RW) and the Belgian Communist Party
(Parti Communiste Belge – PCB). As a result, I could not test this first
hypothesis for all elections under scrutiny: elections of 1977, 1978 and
1991 are left aside. I first calculated the average correlation figures for
each group of parties per party system (Flemish and French-speaking)
and, in a second step, the mean for the whole country. The obtained
results are show in Figure 1.
Overall, parties that are included in the negotiation talks are
much more similar to each other than parties that do not participate
in such meetings. On average, correlation figures reach 0.528 for
the first group of parties while it drops to 0.362 for the latter.
In other words, parties that want to enter government look more
alike than the other parties, meaning that these parties share
policy preferences before the start of the actual process of
government formation. This is not without consequence for the
studies of government formation based on ideological proximity
between parties. Such analyses hypothesize that parties that are the
most similar would enter the cabinet together. However, the results
demonstrate that parties that negotiate are similar, independent
of their entry into government. Proximity assessed in terms of
policy preferences is thus essential for parties to be considered
Figure 1
Average Similarity between Manifestos, per election year (1981–2007)
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for participation in negotiation talks and not for entrance into
the cabinet.
With the exception of the elections of 2007, a clear pattern is
observed in our time period. The differences between the two types
of parties decrease over time. In the 2007 elections, significant
differences are not observed and the similarities between manifestos
are shared by both types of parties. There are no longer clear party
policy differences, mainly because of two convergent phenomena.
First, parties that enter into negotiations look less alike than in the
1980s. Compared to previous elections, they have less in common
and the correlation figures indicate rather low similarities between
these documents. Second, the parties that were not included in such
talks – partly because some of them were never accepted as partners,
such as the extreme-right parties8 – look more alike over time.
One might believe that they adapt and maybe soften their party
manifestos in order to be accepted by other parties.
A characteristic of the Belgian electoral system is its schism along
linguistic lines. Broadly speaking, Flemish parties do not address
French-speaking voters and vice versa, even in the officially bilingual
city of Brussels. Since the split of the traditional political parties into
language-based sister parties (between 1968 and 1978), manifestos
are no longer released in both languages and not even translated.
Language is in this framework an important variable as it allows
us to distinguish Flemish from French-speaking parties. I therefore
test whether the behaviour of the Flemish parties regarding the
government formation is different from the French-speaking ones
within the two distinct party systems.
Disaggregating the data per party system provides more or less
the same results. For both Flemish and French-speaking party
systems, average correlation figures are very similar, confirming the
larger proximity of parties included in government formation talks
compared to the other parties. If the same trends – that is, an
increase in the proximity of parties that did not participate in the
negotiations – are observed, there are some small differences. In
Flanders the elections of 1999 and 2003 witnessed a closer proximity
of non-negotiating parties, compared to that of the parties included
in the talks. As regards French-speaking parties, the differences
between the two types of parties remain to the advantage of the
parties included in the formation negotiations, even if these
differences clearly decrease over time.
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Government Participation
The second hypothesis deals with the impact of government
participation on party policy preferences. Based on previous works
and empirical findings, it is expected that the content of the
manifestos of incumbent parties would be similar. To verify this
hypothesis, I calculated the correlation coefficient of each pair of
parties that were in government at the time of the manifesto’s
release (see Table A2 in the Appendix). When the cabinet includes
more than two parties from the same party system (as in the case of
the elections of 1978 and 2003), I calculated the language-based
average of each pair of parties.
Figure 2 shows that manifestos from parties that were in
government at the time of the manifesto release are moderately
similar. On average, both Flemish and French-speaking governing
parties display correlation coefficients around 0.6 (with, respectively,
average coefficients of 0.603 and 0.592). In addition, both party
systems display similar figures of individual elections, with the
exception of the elections of 1981, 1985 and 1999, and no general
trends can be observed.
The comparison of these figures with the ones obtained at the
level of all the parties for one specific election – that is, including
parties in the majority and in the opposition – delivers interesting
and complementary information (see Table 1). Over the observed
period, manifestos from governing parties look more alike than
those from all parties taken together. Correlation coefficients for
the latter are smaller by 0.109 and 0.124, respectively, among
Flemish and French-speaking parties. At the election level, almost
all coefficients concerning the content of the manifestos from
governing parties indicate a closer proximity than figures for all
parties for one specific election. Exceptions are to be found in 1999
and 2003 in Flanders and in 2003 for French-speaking parties. Even
if these three exceptions do not show large differences (up to
20.068 in 1999), they indicate that similarities between governing
parties are smaller than similarities observed between all parties. In
these cases, the hypothesis of a high similarity of the manifestos
from governing parties has to be rejected.
Similarly, some elections display a relatively high difference in the
correlation coefficients when comparing governing parties with all
parties, as in the case of the Flemish party system (10.338 in 1985,
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10.304 in 1981 and 10.293 in 1991) as well as, in the case of
the French-speaking one (10.280 in 1991). For these elections,
governing parties look alike not only in absolute terms but also in
relative terms since they are more similar than the other parties
competing for the same election. Overall, these elements – average
correlations taken in absolute and relative terms – indicate that the
incumbent hypothesis may play a role for some specific elections but
that similarities between governing parties remain relatively moderate.
If incumbency demonstrates that it may explain some of the similarities
Table 1










1977 0.678 0.632 10.046 – – –
1978 0.505 0.490 10.015 – – –
1981 0.675 0.371 10.304 0.508 0.305 10.203
1985 0.789 0.451 10.338 0.584 0.447 10.137
1987 0.584 0.506 10.078 0.482 0.452 10.030
1991 0.687 0.394 10.293 0.749 0.469 10.280
1995 0.632 0.577 10.055 0.666 0.548 10.119
1999 0.413 0.481 20.068 0.716 0.648 10.068
2003 0.540 0.567 20.028 0.474 0.506 20.032
2007 0.526 0.473 10.053 0.558 0.375 10.183
Total 0.603 0.494 10.109 0.592 0.469 10.124
Figure 2
Average Similarity between Manifestos of Governing Parties, per election year (1977–2007)
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between pairs of manifestos, this hypothesis does not cover all the
observed similarities between manifestos.
The last hypothesis on government participation concerns the
fact that the manifestos of governing and opposition parties are
expected to be different. In order to test this hypothesis, I created
three different indicators allowing us to measure the difference
between governing and opposition parties. The first one, based
on correlation coefficients between governing parties, has been
presented above (Gov-Gov); the second one concerns correlation
coefficients between opposition parties (Opp-Opp); while the third
one concerns correlation coefficients between governing and
opposition parties (Gov-Opp). Each indicator is based on pairs of
individual manifestos and then averaged for each election and party
system – that is, 137 pairs for the Flemish parties and 81 pairs for the
French-speaking ones.
The results displayed in Figure 3 are rather intriguing for
Flanders. Two different periods are to be distinguished. Between
1977 and 1995 – that is, in no fewer than seven elections – the three
indicators remain distinct and allow the identification of different
processes. The line representing the coefficient of correlations
between governing parties (Gov-Gov) is always on top during that
period. On average, pairs of Flemish governing parties tend to be
more similar than any other pair of parties. Below Gov-Gov, the
second line represents the correlation coefficients between govern-
ing and opposition parties (Gov-Opp). This line remains relatively
stable throughout the whole observed period and indicates a fairly
modest – if not weak – similarity between governing and opposition
manifestos. The last line represents the correlation coefficients
between pairs of opposition parties (Opp-Opp). Of the three
indicators, this indicator is always at the bottom and demonstrates
that opposition parties have almost nothing in common in their
manifestos. During that period, similarities between opposition
parties are rare and they share more party preferences with
governing parties than with other opposition parties. As a result,
the hypothesis according to which manifestos from governing and
opposition parties are not alike somehow found confirmation, with the
important observation that opposition parties are even less similar.
The last three elections (1999–2007) present a completely
different pattern. There is no longer a clear upper line and
one can hardly distinguish between averaged pairs of manifestos.
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The correlations between governing parties (Gov-Gov) are surpris-
ingly low, while correlations between opposition are rather strong
(Opp-Opp). In 1999, the weak similarity between governing parties
probably finds its explanation in the fact that the Christian
democratic party Christian People’s Party/Christian Democratic
and Flemish (Christelijke Volkspartij/Christen-Democratisch en
Vlaams – CVP/CD&V) moved into opposition for the first time,
leading to a larger left–right ideological gap between the governing
parties. Indeed, this so-called ‘rainbow’ cabinet gathered the green
party but also the centre-left (socialist) and the centre-right (liberal)
parties while excluding the central Christian democrats. Another
part of the explanation relies on the fact that the green party
(Agalev/Groen!) is no longer in the opposition, leading to a more
homogeneous right-wing opposition (Christian People’s Party/
Christian Democratic and Flemish, Flemish Block/Flemish Interests
(Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang – VB) and People’s Union/New
Flemish Alliance (Volksunie/Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie – VU/N-VA)).
In 2003, manifestos from the opposition parties were more alike
than the ones of the governing parties. This is likely to be the result
of the Dutch-speaking versus French-speaking polarization of the
country and the salience of these linguistic issues in the manifestos
of the opposition parties. With the exception of the green party, all
other opposition parties (Christian People’s Party/Christian Demo-
cratic and Flemish, Flemish Block/Flemish Interests and People’s
Figure 3
Average Similarity between Flemish Manifestos, per election year (1977–2007, N5 137)
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Union/New Flemish Alliance) strongly emphasized the need for
more autonomy (if not independence) for the Flemish region.
Note finally that the line representing the correlation coefficients
between governing and opposition parties (Gov-Opp) remain relatively
stable at around 0.5. The last hypothesis related to the government
and opposition divide is only clearly confirmed in the case of the last
elections of our period (2007) since manifestos from opposition and
governing parties are less similar than any other pair of manifestos.
On the French-speaking side, the hypothesis according to which
manifestos from governing and opposition parties are not alike found
almost perfect confirmation, together with the fact that opposition
parties are even less similar (see Figure 4). As expected, the line
representing the coefficient of correlations between governing parties
(Gov-Gov) is always above, with one exception (the elections of 2003).
On average, pairs of French-speaking governing parties tend to be
more similar than any other pair of parties. The second line represents
the correlation coefficients between governing and opposition parties
(Gov-Opp) and constantly increases from 1981 to 1999. Even if different
coalition formulas have been implemented, governing and opposition
parties are gradually becoming more alike and the indicator even
exceeds the correlations between governing parties (Gov-Gov) for the
1999 elections. The last line represents the correlation coefficients
between pairs of opposition parties (Opp-Opp) and is always situated at
the bottom of the graph. French-speaking parties that sit together
in the opposition have barely anything in common in their mani-
festos. Overall, manifestos from opposition and governing parties are
not similar, confirming the hypothesis, but the similarities between
opposition parties are even smaller.
Yet, the three indicators demonstrate an important convergence
of policy preferences over time, with average correlations between
0.2 and 0.5 in 1981 to average correlations between 0.5 and 0.7 in
1999. Independent of their position – majority or opposition –
French-speaking parties are becoming more alike. Unlike Flemish
parties, the rejection of the central Christian democratic party
Social Christian Party/Humanist Democratic Centre (Parti Social
Chre´tien/Centre De´mocrate Humaniste – PSC/CDH) from govern-
ment and into the opposition in 1999 did not lead to smaller
similarities between the coalition partners that were no longer
connected on the left–right dimension. The observed convergence
stops abruptly in 1999 and the manifestos tend to diverge after that
647THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION AND PROSPECTS
Jc The Author 2013. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
date. This trend needs to be confirmed by analysing the manifestos
for the 2010 elections. The explanation of the poor performance of
the indicator of the similarities between governing parties in 2003
(Gov-Gov) is probably to be found in the larger polarization of
the two coalition partners – that is, the centre-left (socialist) and
centre-right (liberal) parties – on socioeconomic issues.
DISCUSSION
This article aimed to analyse party policy preferences and
hypothesized that government-related phenomena could have an
impact on the similarities between electoral platforms of political parties.
Indeed, the drafting of a party manifesto is a very complex exercise
that requires an arbitrage between subtle equilibriums, depending on
the party’s objective, including for the post-election period.
If the party aims to maximize its electoral result by attracting the
electorate, the voter is the target of its manifesto. If the party aims to
enter government and to be part of the coalition, its platform is also
targeted at the other parties, and more particularly at its potential
partners in the future coalition. In these cases, the voter does not
remain the primary target of a manifesto, and the parties are driven
away from the concerns voiced by the public (see Bara 2001, which
Figure 4
Average Similarities between French-speaking Manifestos, per election year (1981–2007,
N5 81)
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linked party manifestos and the most important issue in opinion
polls, and also Bartle et al. 2011).
Parties that want to enter government should adopt positions in
their manifestos that render them ‘acceptable’ by the other potential
partners, by ideologically moderating policy stances in their manifestos
and by minimizing the ideological distance with the different coalition
partners. Yet, the parties which enter coalitions may not be those with
the closest ideological proximity. In countries with fragmented party
systems, parties would consider entering a coalition based on other
considerations, such as previous governing experiences with these
parties, political culture or simple parliamentary arithmetic (see the
numerous examples in Laver and Budge 1992).
Analysing the content of party manifestos in Belgium during three
decades, I demonstrated the closer proximity of parties included in
government formation talks compared to the other parties. I also
observed that the differences between the two types of parties
decrease over time and that, in more recent elections, parties tended
to display similar preferences, independent of their ability/will-
ingness to be included in the coalition formation talks.
The empirical verification of the first hypothesis leads to an
important theoretical consideration. The literature on government
formation often uses policy preferences as an independent variable
that helps to explain the coalition formation process. Proximity
models hypothesize that parties that have similar policy preferences
are likely to form a coalition. However, I demonstrated that
government participation prospects have an impact on the content
of these policy preferences. If parties strategically adapt their electoral
platforms in order to enter government, any study aiming at explain-
ing coalition formation and/or government agreements based on
party preferences is biased. To put it simply, studies on coalition
formation analyse the capacity of preference adaptation of a party to
other potential partners rather than its ‘real’ policy preferences. Not
only does the party soften its discourse and moderate its policy
stances, but it also artificially renders its manifesto ‘acceptable’ by
adopting the other parties’ favoured policies. Coalitions are obviously
made up of parties with similar policy preferences, not because they
‘are’ alike but because parties strategically ‘make’ them alike.
As a result, one should be more cautious when using party
preferences in order to explain the government formation process,
and more particularly the hypothesis according to which the parties
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that are located close to each other would form a coalition. Even if I
do not argue that ‘electoral programs present an initial obstacle rather
than an aid to the formation of the government’ (Klingemann et al.
1994: 33), I still believe that the use of party preferences – and more
particularly party manifestos – in the understanding of government
formation is particularly inadequate. Instead, future models should
consider party policy preferences as the dependent variable rather
than the independent variable.
Because governing parties experienced the fact of governing
together and went through the same major political events and
because they are similarly bound by the government record,
I expected that such parties would display more similar policy
preferences than any other pair of parties (whether in government
or in opposition). In my analyses of the Belgian case, I observed that
incumbency plays a role for most elections but that similarities
between governing parties remain relatively modest and exceptions
are to be found. Yet, governing parties tend to be more similar to each
other than any other pair of parties. Similarities between opposition
parties are rare and they share more party preferences with governing
parties than with other opposition parties. As a result, the hypothesis
according to which manifestos from governing and opposition parties
are not alike somehow found confirmation, with the important
observation that opposition parties are even less similar.
Even if my analyses proved that the distinction between three
different pairs of parties (the so-called Gov-Gov, Opp-Opp and Gov-Opp
measurements) is more relevant than the mere distinction between
governing and opposition parties, some issues remain unsolved. In
particular, the relevance of my findings is questioned since 1999 and
2003 constitute peculiar election years. In those elections, the policy
preferences of the governing parties and of the parties involved in
coalition talks were not very different from other parties’ preferences.
One explanation may reside in the fact that those elections witnessed
the emergence of the first cabinets since 1958 to send the centrist
Christian democratic party family into the opposition and instead
mainly gathered parties from the centre left and centre right. The
consensus around the creation of a government without this party
family was rather strong among the other parties, leading to a greater
similarity in terms of policy preferences among those parties,
independent of their governmental status (in government or in
opposition) or their linguistic status (Flemish or French-speaking).
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Parties Included in Government Formation Process (1977–2007)
Election
year Cabinet Parties
1977 Tindemans IV CVP, PSB/BSP, PVV, PRLW, PSC, VU, FDF
1978 Martens I CVP, PS, SP, VU, PSC, PVV, PRL, FDF
1981 Martens V CVP, SP, PS, PSC, PVV, PRL
1985 Martens VI CVP, PVV, PRL, PSC
1987 Martens VIII): CVP, PSC, PS, SP, VU
1991 Dehaene I CVP, SP, PS, PSC, PVV, PRL, VU, Ecolo, Agalev
1995 Dehaene II CVP, SP, PS, PSC
1999 Verhofstadt I VLD, SP, Agalev, PS, PRL-FDF, Ecolo
2003 Verhofstadt II VLD, SP, PS, PRL-FDF-MCC
2007 Verhofstadt III CD&V/N-VA, Open VLD, PS, MR, CDH
Table A2
Parties in Government (at the expected time of manifesto release, 1977–2007)
Election year Parties
1977 CVP, PVV, PRLW, PSC
1978 CVP, PSB/BSP, VU, PSC, FDF
1981 CVP, SP, PS, PSC
1985 CVP, PVV, PRL, PSC
1987 CVP, PVV, PRL, PSC
1991 CVP, SP, PS, PSC
1995 CVP, SP, PS, PSC
1999 CVP, SP, PS, PSC
2003 VLD, SP.A, Agalev, PS, MR, Ecolo
2007 Open VLD, SP.A, PS, MR
Note: Agalev5green party; BSP5Belgian Socialist Party, Belgische Socialistische
Partij; CD&V5Christian Democratic and Flemish, Christen-Democratisch
en Vlaams; CDH5Humanist Democratic Centre, Centre De´mocrate
Humaniste; CVP5Christian People’s Party, Christelijke Volskpartij;
Ecolo5green party; FDF5French-speaking Democratic Front, Front
De´mocratique des Francophones; MCC5Citizen’s Movement for Change,
Mouvement des Citoyens pour le Changement; MR5Reform Movement,
Mouvement Re´formateur; N-VA5New Flemish Alliance, Nieuw-Vlaamse
Alliantie; Open VLD5Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, Open Vlaamse
Liberalen en Democraten; PRL5Liberal Reformist Party, Parti Re´formateur
Libe´ral; PRLW5Liberal Reformist Party of Wallonia, Parti Re´formateur Libe´ral
de Wallonie; PVV5Party for Freedom and Progress, Partij voor Vrijheid en
Vooruitgang; PS5Socialist Party, Parti Socialiste; PSB5Belgian Socialist Party,
Parti Socialiste Belge; PSC5Social Christian Party, Parti Social Chre´tien;
SP5Socialist Party, Socialistische Partij; SP.A5Socialist Party Different,
Socialistische Partij Anders; VLD5Flemish Liberals and Democrats,
Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten; VU5People’s Union, Volksunie.
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NOTES
1 Klingemann et al. (1994) had argued before that coalition agreements omit most
contentious matters.
2 The popularity of the concept of ‘policy preferences’ originates from the seminal
book of Budge et al. (2001).
3 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2009: 2) stated that ‘the progress in the literature
towards explaining which issues parties focus on has been limited’.
4 In addition, one specific hypothesis has been formulated regarding the impact of
the government formation process on the manifesto length. Daubler (2010: 19)
hypothesized that, since parties want to keep their post-electoral options open by
not committing to policies, they should draft shorter manifestos. In addition, this
author expected that election manifestos would be longer as the expected
complexity of post-electoral government negotiations increases.
5 This project is directed by Stefaan Walgrave (University of Antwerp) and financed
by the University of Antwerp and the European Science Foundation (ESF) via the
FWO. The coding management has been supervised by Jeroen Joly (McGill
University and University of Antwerp) and Re´gis Dandoy (FLACSO and University
of Zurich).
6 A regression model based on correlations of pairs of manifestos presents some
weaknesses. For example, one cannot control for interesting party variables (size,
ideology, and so on) and therefore they bring no added value to the correlations. In
addition, the absence of regression models does not prevent us from drawing
conclusions on the effect of government participation and prospect on party
preferences since there is no need for a regression model (that is, one specifically
designed for causal relations). Time is intrinsically present as manifestos are drafted
and released a few months before the elections and, by extension, before
government formation. The figures presenting the average correlations across time
and type of parties represent the observed findings more clearly.
7 Another way to solve that problem is to select only the parties whose leader was
received by the king during the royal hearings phase of the negotiation process. But
since all democratic parties participate in that phase of the negotiations, the
obtained results would basically separate democratic from extreme-right parties.
8 Both Flemish and French-speaking party systems witnessed the emergence of a
rather successful extreme-right party. In reaction, the other parties decided to set
up a ‘cordon sanitaire’ – that is, they excluded these parties from government at all
policy levels. This systematic exclusion from power led the extreme-right parties
gradually to adapt their manifesto and soften their positions on migration or on key
socioeconomic issues.
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